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Variations in the Effect of Parental Breakup on Children’s Education
Abstract
This paper explores variations in the negative effect of parental breakup on children’s 
chances to obtain a tertiary education, across contexts (countries and cohorts). We use data 
from the first wave of the Generations and Gender Survey from 13 countries and four birth 
cohorts, complemented by selected macro-level indicators (divorce rate and educational 
expansion). Fixed-effect logistic regressions show that the negative effect of experiencing 
parental separation is stronger in recent birth cohorts, which experienced higher parental 
divorce rates. Random-intercept logistic regression models confirm that the negative effect 
of parental breakup is significantly stronger when divorce is more common. The 
explanation, we argue, rests on declining level of parental conflict in splitting families: as 
divorce spreads in society, even couples with less conflict separate. A child from a 
dissolving low-conflict family is strongly negatively affected by loss of the family, whereas 
a child from a high-conflict family is rather relieved from a dysfunctional parental 
relationship and the positive effects of breakup may outweigh the negative ones. With 
increasing divorce rates and the changing composition of the population of splitting 
families, the share of low-conflict dissolving families increases and hence the average 
negative effect of breakup becomes more negative.
Key words: Divorce, Divorce rate, Family structure, Educational attainment
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1 Introduction
Sociological and demographic investigations have shown repeatedly that parental divorce has a 
multitude of negative effects on the offspring. Children of divorced parents, in comparison to 
children from non-divorced families, have lower scores on various dimensions of well-being 
(Amato and Keith 1991b), attain less education (Evans et al. 2001; Fischer 2007; Fronstin et al. 
2001; Keith and Finlay 1988; Liu 2007), and work in occupations of lower prestige and earnings 
(Amato and Keith 1991a; Fischer 2007; although this last finding may not hold for both genders, 
see Kiernan 1997). Their future family formation is also impacted as the children of divorce are 
more likely to cohabit before marriage, enter marriage at younger ages, and experience higher 
risks of subsequent marital dissolution (Amato 1996, 2003; Biblarz and Raftery 1999; Diekmann 
and Engelhart 1999; Glenn and Kramer 1987; Keith and Finlay 1988; Li and Wu 2008; 
Wolfinger 1999).
While the negative consequences of parental divorce on children’s life chances are well 
documented, less is known about long-term trends and cross-country differences in the strength 
of this effect. In this paper, we develop hypotheses on the change in the size of the negative 
effect of parental breakup over successive cohorts and generalize them to differences across 
countries by linking variations in the association between parental breakup and offspring’s 
college graduation to the prevailing divorce rate. We test these hypotheses using both fixed-effect 
and random-effect logistic regression models applied to data from 13 countries and four birth 
cohorts (i.e. a total of 52 macro-level contexts) from the surveys organized under the Generations 
and Gender Programme.
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We find that the negative effect of parental separation is stronger when divorce is more 
common. We attribute this finding to the declining selection into divorce on the intensity of 
parental conflict: as divorce spreads, even couples with less conflict separate. The 
dissolution of a high-conflict family may be a relief for the child. The breakup of a low-
conflict family, on the other hand, is more likely to harm the child. As divorce becomes 
more common, more and more low-conflict families split and the negative effects are 
encountered more frequently in the population. Then the negative consequences outweigh 
the positive ones and the overall negative effect becomes stronger.
2 Socioeconomic Disadvantage of Children of Divorce
Researchers have offered numerous explanations of why parental divorce negatively influences 
children’s educational attainment. These explanations operate with three major arguments. One 
line of reasoning focuses on the stress associated with parental breakup, another one emphasizes 
economic and social deprivation associated with changing household structure, and the last 
perspective highlights selection into divorce of parents with specific pre-existing qualities (see 
Amato 1993, 2000 for a review).
Some authors emphasize that parental conflict before and during divorce – rather than divorce 
per se – and the resulting stress cause the negative outcomes in children (Amato 1993; Biblarz 
and Raftery 1999; this is often labelled as “process perspective on divorce”). Not only that the 
offspring generally suffer from witnessing parental quarrels; they often become part of them and 
are forced to “choose sides”. The relationship between children and parents deteriorates as a 
result. Moreover, children may develop feelings of guilt and responsibility for the situation. 
Parental conflict can also serve as a bad behavioural and problem-solving example (Amato 
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1993). Children’s school outcomes or life chances in general are negatively impacted as a 
consequence.
The detrimental effect of parental breakup does not have a single source. The stress results from 
an “accumulation of negative events” (Amato 1993: 33-34), i.e. it is produced by the totality of 
all negative events occurring during and after parental divorce (Amato and Booth 1991). These 
negative events include not only parental conflict, but also, frequently, diminished contact with 
one parent and grandparents. Tension in the relationship with the custodial parent may also 
increase. Further sources of discomfort may stem from parting with pets and changing residence 
and school (Amato 1993; see also Sun and Li 2009).
The “parental adjustment” perspective emphasizes the pivotal role of the psychological 
adjustment of the custodial parent after divorce (Amato 1993). The strength of the divorce effect 
on the child is dependent on the ability of the custodial parent to cope with the divorce and the 
post-divorce situation. The worse the parent copes, the stronger the detrimental effect on 
children. This perspective is based on the view that stress interferes with parenting skills (Amato 
1993). Since divorce is a highly stressful event, it is predicted “that decrements in the custodial 
parent’s psychological state and ability to function effectively in the parental role following 
marital dissolution can lower the well-being of children” (Amato 1993: 28).
Parental breakup also leads to economic and social deprivation, which also results in poorer 
school outcomes. Economic hardship reduces the resources available for the children’s 
education. Family dissolution also has indirect effects on children’s schooling, since the custodial 
parent often intensifies her/his work effort to compensate for the income loss and is therefore less 
often available to help the children with homework and supervise them. Furthermore, a tight 
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budget may force the custodial parent to move to a cheaper neighbourhood with lower-quality 
schools (Amato and Booth 1991; Fronstin et al. 2001; Garasky 1995; Sun and Li 2001, 2009). In 
extreme cases, the adolescent child may be forced to leave school and find a job to contribute to 
the family budget (Keith and Finlay 1988).
Children in single-parent families lack support, efficient supervision, self-esteem, and relevant 
role models as a result of losing frequent contact with one of the parents. The parenting of a 
single parent is often inconsistent, and the relationship between a single parent and the child is 
less hierarchically structured and more peer-like. Single parents can also hold unrealistic 
expectations concerning the maturity of the child. Taken together, these factors also impact 
children’s life chances negatively (Amato and Booth 1991; Biblarz and Raftery 1999; Keith and 
Finlay 1988; Amato (1993) calls this argument “parental loss perspective”). As summarized by 
Garasky (1995: 92), the negative effect on education stems from the fact that children from 
single parent families experience a different family hierarchy than their counterparts in intact 
families: “educational attainment [is seen] as a consequence of parental ability to provide 
children with the motivation and skills necessary for school achievement. Family disruption (…) 
weakens the parent-child relationship and reduces the internalization of parental values and role 
models. […] This may reduce direct supervision, undermine parental control, and handicap the 
ability to function in institutions that are fundamentally hierarchical, such as education”.
The selection argument proposes that individuals more prone to divorce also have worse 
parenting skills (Amato 2000; Biblarz and Gottainer 2000; Biblarz and Raftery 1999; Holley et 
al. 2006). As summarized by Biblarz and Raftery (1999: 326), “people who divorce, for example, 
are less stable or less competent at family life. Children who experience their parents’ divorce do 
less well because their parents are less competent, not because of the divorce per se. (…) The 
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divorce, like the negative child outcomes, may have been a consequence of some pre-existing 
family dysfunction”.
The selection hypothesis also acknowledges differences between divorced and widowed single-
parent families. While the “parental loss” theory would predict the same level of well-being for 
children in any single parent family type, Biblarz and Gottainer (2000) found that children of 
single widows resemble children from intact families in their educational outcomes and 
happiness. Furthermore, they also noticed that children of divorced single mothers are 
significantly worse off than children from both intact and widowed households. This gradient of 
outcomes seems to be a general finding across a variety of outcomes (Amato 1993).
3 Variations in the Effect of Divorce on Educational Attainment
Parental separation has become a more common experience in most countries. We argue that this 
rising prevalence of family dissolution may have a changing impact on educational outcomes. 
Theoretically, both a decrease and an increase in the negative effects of parental breakup on 
children can be predicted across successive cohorts within countries. The former expectation 
stems from three sources: increasingly tolerant attitudes and norms, liberalizing divorce 
legislation, and declining selection on poor parental skills. The latter expectation results from 
declining levels of parental conflict that may trigger family dissolution. As a consequence, later 
cohorts contain a larger fraction of children among whom the negative consequences of divorce 
outweigh the benefits of escaping from stressful environment.
Higher divorce rates are associated with tolerance, liberal legislation, reduced selection on 
parenting skills, and reduced parental conflict, while lower divorce rates correlate with less 
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tolerance, more restrictive legislative regulations, high levels of selection on poor parenting 
skills, and high selection on parental conflict (González and Viitanen, 2006; Goode 1993; 
Kalmijn 2010; Kalmijn and Uunk 2007). Thus the detrimental effect of divorce should be less 
severe when divorce is more common, since attitudes and norms are more permissive and the 
divorced families are stigmatized to a lesser degree as a result (Becker 1993; Dronkers et al. 
2006; Prokopec 1972; Wolfinger 1999). Similarly more liberal divorce legislation makes divorce 
less stressful and thus lessens the harm to both parents and children (Dronkers et al. 2006; Sigle-
Rushton et al. 2005). The selection explanation of the disadvantage to children of divorce would 
also predict the negative effect of parental divorce to be diminishing (Kalmijn 2010). When 
divorce becomes more common, the splitting couples should be less stigmatized than those with 
worse parenting skills (Diekmann and Engelhardt 1999; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2005). We call this 
set of arguments the declining stress and selection hypothesis.
On the other hand, the process perspective on divorce (Luepnitz 1979; Morrison and Cherlin 
1995; Sun 2001; Sun and Li 2001) and the parental conflict explanation (Amato 2000; Amato et 
al. 1995; Booth and Amato 2001; Hanson 1999) would lead us to predict increasing disadvantage 
when divorce is more widespread. Becker’s (1993) economic theory of marriage offers a similar 
prediction. Using the concepts of gain and utility, Becker argues that the utility of marriage was 
high in the past and thus only high-conflict marriages dissolved. However, as specialization of 
men in market production and of women in household production declined in Western societies 
in the second half of the twentieth century, the gains from marriage become smaller (see also 
Oppenheimer 1997 for a review of this literature). Hence the partners have much less to lose if 
they break up, so even low-conflict marriages often divorce (see also Wolfinger 1999).
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Amato and Hohmann-Marriott (2007) indeed documented an increase in the incidence of 
dissolution in low-distress marriages. While dissolution of a high-conflict family may have no 
detrimental effect on the child’s well-being and can even bring a relief from a stressful living 
arrangement, the breakup of a low-conflict marriage may cause much more stress and feelings of 
loss for the child (Amato et al. 1995; Hanson 1999; see also Kalmijn and Monden 2006 for a 
similar hypothesis applied to the well-being of parents). This is called the declining parental  
conflict hypothesis.
4 Comparative Research on the Effects of Divorce
Sociologists have been paying increasing attention to variations in the effects of divorce across 
subpopulations within countries since the 1990s (Amato 2000; Amato and Cheadle 2008; Biblarz 
and Raftery 1993; Dronkers 1999; Kalmijn 2010; Kalmijn and Monden 2006; McLanahan and 
Sandefur 1994). Scholars, however, have focused much less on variations in the size of divorce’s 
effect across societies or over cohorts. Notable exceptions that study the association between an 
individual’s divorce and well-being include Stack and Eshleman’s (1998) comparative study of 
16 countries based on data from the 1980s, Diener and colleagues’ investigation of 42 countries 
in the 1990s (Diener et al. 2000), and Kalmijn’s recent study examining 38 countries from the 
European Value Study/World Value Study databases (Kalmijn 2010). While Stack and 
Eshleman’s (1998) examination indicated equality in the effects of marital status on well-being 
across countries, Diener et al. (2000) revealed a relatively weak negative association between the 
size of the divorce effect (i.e. a contrast between the married and the divorced) and the overall 
tolerance towards divorce in a country. Kalmijn’s (2010) analysis of respondents’ psychological 
well-being interacted several macro-level variables (e.g. divorce rate, church attendance, 
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familialism, and approval of divorce) with individual-level indicators of divorce and found that 
the individual-level effect of divorce was somewhat weaker when divorce was more common.
Examinations of the stability of the effect of divorce within countries are likewise uncommon, 
and even more so with children’s education as the dependent variable. Existing studies have 
achieved very ambiguous results, perhaps slightly favoring the no-trend conclusion. Evans et al. 
(2001) found that the detrimental effect of parental divorce on the odds of secondary school 
graduation increased over successive birth cohorts in Australia, while the effect of divorce on the 
likelihood of college completion did not change. Ely et al. (1999) compared individuals born in 
1946, 1958, and 1970 in Britain and found no change in the negative effect of divorce on 
education. Whereas birth cohort was the only instrument for measuring development over time in 
this analysis, it was taken to approximate concurring changes such as rising unemployment, 
rising female employment rates, shift to the service sector, and increase in the divorce rate. The 
authors did not include any direct measurements of these variables into their models. Sigle-
Rushton et al. (2005) similarly identified no change in divorce effect over time in Britain. The 
authors also used birth cohorts as the basis for their comparison and employed no other 
measurement of social change, despite remarking on the increase in divorce rates throughout the 
1970s and the increased likelihood of the 1970 birth cohort to have experienced parental divorce 
and elevated divorce rates. Gähler and Garriga (2013), who studied psychological maladjustment 
of children, also found a weakening effect of divorce between two Swedish surveys carried out 
in 1968 and 2000 (this result, however, was not statistically significant).
Comparisons of the well-being of children in divorced and step-families offer ancillary evidence 
in favor of a growing negative individual-level effect of divorce. For instance Andersson (2002) 
pointed out that countries with relatively higher family disruption rates also exhibit higher rates 
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of re-marriage. It has been recognized that children in stepfamilies fare worse compared to their 
counterparts in two-biological-parent families (Garasky 1995; Raley et al. 2005). It has also been 
observed that remarriages are more unstable than first marriages (Coleman et al. 2000; Cherlin 
1978, 1981; Furstenberg and Spanier 1984; Halliday 1980). Some authors argue that it is the 
experience of multiple family transitions, rather than the experience of divorce or any particular 
family type, that has the most pronounced impact (Aquilino 1996; Raley et al. 2005). It therefore 
can be expected that children of divorced parents are more socioeconomically disadvantaged in 
the context of high divorce rates (and therefore high remarriage and a higher number of 
transitions experienced in household composition) than children of divorced parents in contexts 
with less divorce (and hence less re-marriage and more overall stability in household 
composition).
Since the empirical evidence regarding variations in the size of the effect of divorce on children’s 
education has been mixed so far (see also Amato and Keith 1991a; Evans et al. 2001; Sigle-
Rushton et al. 2005), our analysis aims to explore which of the hypotheses outlined above has 
more empirical support. Both of the hypotheses relate variations in the size of the divorce effect 
to changes in the prevalence of divorce: Is the negative effect of breakup stronger (as is predicted 
by the declining parental conflict perspective) when divorce is more common, or is it weaker (as 
is predicted by the declining stress and selection hypothesis)?
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5 Data and Variables
We use data from the first wave of surveys organized under the Generations and Gender 
Programme (United Nations 2005).1 This data set is unique due to its internationally comparative 
nature and the indicators contained in the questionnaire (it maps respondents’ family situation 
during childhood in a rather detailed way, and it also contains cross-nationally harmonized 
measures of respondent’s and parents’ educational attainment). As of this writing, data from 15 
countries were available in the GGP data archive, plus we had access to the Czech data through 
one of the co-authors who had been a member of the Czech GGP team. In principle we wanted to 
use as many countries as possible, yet some countries could not be utilized. Austrian data were 
left out of the analysis, since the sample only covered a narrow age range. Russian and Georgian 
data were not used because no reasonably good measures of the context-level variables 
(primarily the crude divorce rate, see below) were available from external sources. Hence we 
investigate 13 countries altogether: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Romania. Interviews 
were conducted – depending on local circumstances – between 2001 and 2010. We see the data 
as hierarchically structured, with individual respondents nested within macro-level contexts. The 
macro-level contexts are represented by each unique combination of country and birth cohort. 
Since we have 13 countries and 4 birth cohorts (see below), we examine 52 macro-level 
contexts.
1 These data were – with the exception of the Czech sample – obtained from the GGP Data 
Archive and were created by the organizations and individuals listed for each particular data set 
at http://www.unece.org/pau/ggp/acknowledge.htm. 
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The dependent variable in our analysis is a binary indicator of a respondent’s college graduation 
(coded 1 if respondent ever graduated from college and 0 otherwise; college graduation implies 
category 5 or 6 on the ISCED scale included in the data set). A dichotomous variable indicating 
that respondent’s parents broke up before his/her 18th birthday is our key explanatory variable. 
This measure is created on the basis of two questions from the questionnaire. Respondents were 
asked whether their biological parents ever broke up2, and how old were they at the time of 
parental breakup. The cutoff point at 18 years was chosen because students typically leave 
secondary education and enter college soon after their 18th birthday (cf. Fischer 2007). In 
principle, family dissolution affects children of any age (Liu 2007; Palosaari and Aro 1994). 
There does not seem to be any widely-used theory-based age limit beyond which parental 
divorce would be expected to have no effect. Age limits used in various analyses seem to be 
mostly pragmatic, oftentimes related to the nature of the data or to the dependent variable (see 
e.g. Chase-Lansdale et al. 1995; Fronstin et al. 2001; Furstenberg and Kiernan 2001; Kiernan 
1997; Ross and Mirowsky 1999). When not limited by the data, authors use an array of different 
ages, usually without much direct explanation. For example, the age limit used by Liu (2007) 
2 Breakup is not conceptually identical to divorce, but the GGS questionnaire does not let us 
distinguish divorce/separation of married parents and splitting up of a cohabiting couple. To the 
extent that cohabitation is a less institutionalized union (Nock 1995), confers fewer advantages to 
members of the household (including children’s educational opportunity, see Brown 2004; 
Bulanda and Manning 2008; Kennedy and Bumpass 2008; Manning and Lamb 2003; Raley et al. 
2005; Soons and Kalmijn 2009), and breaks up more often and more easily than marriage 
(Manning et al. 2004; Wu and Music 2008), the splitting of a cohabiting couple should have a 
less pronounced negative effect on children than divorce. Therefore, our estimates of the effect of 
breakup may be taken as the lower boundary estimate of the divorce effect.
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was 18 years; Garasky (1995) on the other hand used age 14. Some authors follow the incidence 
of parental divorce well into respondents’ twenties (e.g., Aquilino 1994; Furstenberg and Kiernan 
2001; Kiernan 1997). Since there is little consensus regarding what the most appropriate age 
limit is for our analysis, we also conducted all analyses with a threshold set at 15 years to see if 
the results are sensitive to this particular decision (we report the sensitivity analyses below).
We also use respondent’s gender (coded 1 if male, 0 if female) and parental educational 
attainment as controls. Parental education is based on a slightly simplified ISCED scale; we 
distinguish 3 substantive categories (up to lower secondary, upper secondary, tertiary) plus a 
separate category for respondents without a valid response.3 We use the education of the better-
educated parent. Country is used as a set of 12 dummy indicators (Australia serves as the 
reference category when country enters the analysis as a set of binary indicators). We 
differentiate four birth cohorts (1940-1949, 1950-1959, 1960-1969, 1970+; although the data file 
contains individuals born before 1940, we set the birth year limit to avoid distortions caused by 
unreliable historical macro-level data).
Explicit indicators of country and cohort are only used in some of the models. In other models, 
these indicators are replaced by two continuous macro-level explanatory variables – crude 
divorce rate (CDR) and the percentage of individuals in each cohort attaining tertiary education. 
These variables were taken from an external source (UN Demographic Year Books, Eurostat, 
OECD).4 Divorce rate is our key theoretical concept (see above), whereas educational expansion 
3 We did, however, carry out all analyses without respondents who had not reported their parents’ 
highest level of schooling. The results are reported below.
4 Divorce rate data were only available for the period after 1960 in Estonia, and we also lack 
CDR data for 1948-1959. We used a non-linear extrapolation to fill in the missing data points. 
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is a control variable used to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of CDR (and its 
interactions), because educational expansion is correlated with divorce rates (both are typically 
higher in more advanced societies) and also seems to impact on inequality of education 
opportunity (see e.g. Shavit et al. 2007).
The proportion of respondents with tertiary education by country and cohort is shown in Fig. 1. 
Clearly, enrolments grew in all countries. The share of people with tertiary education varies 
between 7 and 28 % among individuals born in the 1940s, and then grows to 11 – 34 % in the 
cohorts born around 1960. The share of university graduates reaches to between 17 and 43 % in 
the youngest birth cohorts. The best educated populations were in the Netherlands, Australia, 
Belgium, France, and Norway, while the least educated populations were in Hungary, Romania, 
Italy, and the Czech Republic for most of the twentieth century.
<Fig. 1 about here>
All countries investigated in this paper experienced increasing divorce rates during the twentieth 
century. Figure 2 shows that the crude divorce rate was very low (below 1) until WWII. CDR 
then followed an upward trend in all countries, but at differing paces. In addition, there were 
several changes in national divorce laws that caused sudden upward and downward shifts which, 
however, did not reverse the main trends in the long run (see Appendix for a description of 
selected major changes in national divorce legislations as well as changes in CDR).
The extrapolation was based on data from 1960-1965. We decided not to use more recent years 
for the extrapolation, since a legislative change in 1965 resulted in a sudden increase in CDR 
from 2.3 to 3.2 between 1965 and 1966.
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<Fig. 2 about here>
Each unique combination of country by cohort (i.e. each macro-context) was assigned values for 
its macro-level variables on the basis of the following procedures: Divorce rates were computed 
using information on the known average age at parental breakup of the children that actually 
experienced breakup in that specific country/cohort combination before their 18th birthday 
(respondents were typically around 8 years old at the time of parental breakup). For each macro-
level unit we took the crude divorce rate in the given country in years when the children’s 
parents were typically splitting up, and averaged them (for instance the mean age at parental 
breakup was 10 in the Australian cohort born 1940-1949, so the average divorce rate of the 1950-
1959 period was assigned to all respondents in this cohort; the actual value is 0.8). Similarly, we 
averaged the share of people with university education in each macro-level unit to obtain a 
measure of educational expansion. We rescaled both variables to the 0-1 range, where 0 
corresponds to the minimal value found in the data (in case of the crude divorce rate, the lowest 
value was 0 in Italy in the older cohorts) and value 1 to the highest value (the highest average 
divorce rate is 4.05 and is found in the youngest cohort in Estonia).
<Table 1 about here>
The original data contained 130,244 cases (individual respondents) in our set of 13 countries. We 
limited the dataset to respondents born after 1940 (see above). Furthermore, we only utilize 
respondents older than 26 years at the time of the interview to make sure that they had enough 
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time to obtain tertiary education. These choices reduced the sample size to 94,502 cases (i.e. 73 
% of the original sample size). After cases with missing data on the dependent variable 
(respondent’s education), parental breakup, and respondent’s gender were deleted, we obtained a 
final sample of 93,413 cases, i.e. only 1 % of eligible cases were lost due to missing responses 
(see Table 1). Some of the sensitivity analyses reported below may be based on a slightly 
different sample (this will be explicitly emphasized in the respective paragraph).
6 Results
6.1 Binary Logistic Regression Models
We begin with a series of binary logistic regression models predicting college graduation (the 
goodness of fit statistics of these models are presented in Table 2). As a first step, we want to see 
if the effect of parental breakup varies over cohorts within countries, with and without other 
level-1 controls. Our first model contains only three predictors: parental breakup, country, and 
cohort (this is Model 1 in Table 2). Then, we add the interaction between cohort and breakup into 
the model and create Model 2. Statistical comparison of these two models tells us that – by 
criteria of classical inference – we shall not omit the interaction from Model 2 (the likelihood 
ratio test comparing the two models yields L2 = 11.0 with three degrees of freedom, which 
implies a p-value of 0.012). When judged by the two information criteria presented in Table 2 
(AIC and BIC), we do not reach a clear conclusion – AIC suggests that we should favour the 
model with interactions, while BIC is in favour of the more parsimonious model.
We carry out a similar test by comparing Model 3 and Model 4, which also control for other 
level-1 variables (respondent’s gender and parental education), but are otherwise identical to 
Models 1 and 2. The comparison of Model 3 and Model 4 returns L2 = 4.5 (with 3 d. f.; p-value = 
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0.213), which indicates that the interaction between parental breakup and cohort is not 
statistically significant once the controls are introduced into the model. Also AIC and BIC favour 
Model 3 over Model 4.
<Table 2 about here>
The estimated coefficients of Model 2 are presented in Table 3. We see that the effect of parental 
breakup is not significant in the 1940-1949 birth cohort, though it is negative (the effect on the 
log odds of completing tertiary education is -0.141). The effect becomes more negative in each 
subsequent birth cohort. For instance, the difference in the log odds of graduating from college 
between children of divorced parents and children from intact families was -0.276 (= -0.141-
0.135; see Table 3) in the 1960-1969 birth cohort and it further grew to -0.417 (= -0.141-0.276, 
see Table 3) in the post-1970 birth cohort. The difference in the effect of breakup between the 
eldest and youngest cohort is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (see Table 3).
<Table 3 about here>
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Table 3 also presents the estimated coefficients of Model 4. We have seen that the interaction 
between parental breakup and cohort as a whole fails to reach standard levels of statistical 
significance. Yet, when we look at the individual elements of this interaction (and the 
corresponding main effects), we see a pattern of an increasingly negative effect of breakup over 
cohorts. First, Model 4 shows that breakup has a statistically significant net effect in the oldest 
cohort. Once we control for parental education and respondent’s gender, the main effect of 
breakup on the log odds of college completion is -0.237 (see Table 3), which is statistically 
significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. Furthermore, we see stronger negative effects 
over cohorts: in the most recent cohort the effect of breakup is -0.422 (= -0.237-0.185, see Table 
3). We see that the net effect of breakup is fully comparable in size with the total effect. The 
difference in the sizes of the slopes in the eldest and youngest cohorts is significant at the 0.1 
level (see Table 3). 5
Overall, we can conclude that the negative effect of parental breakup on children’s education has 
grown (at least) in the most recent birth cohort. The same conclusion holds for the total effect as 
well as for the net effect controlling for respondent’s gender, parental education, and country. We 
5 If we limit our sample to respondents who reported their parents’ education and re-estimate 
Models 2 and 4, we see the same pattern. The main effect of breakup on the log odds of college 
graduation is -0.092, and the effect in the most recent cohort is -0.401 (= -0.092-0.309) in the re-
estimated Model 2. Similarly, in re-estimated Model 4 the main effect is -0.240, and the effect in 
the latest cohort is -0.458 (= -0.240-0.218). The difference between the two slopes is statistically 
significantly different from 0 at the 0.01 level in both Model 2 and Model 4. Applying listwise 
deletion of missing data reduces the sample size to 88,941 cases, but this does not affect the 
substantive conclusions.
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attribute the non-significant total effect of breakup in the eldest cohort of Model 2 to the 
confounding effect of parental education: better educated parents were more likely to divorce in 
the older cohorts, and the negative net effect of divorce was offset by the positive effect of 
parental education. This confounding effect became less salient (or even disappeared) in more 
recent cohorts with the reversal of the education gradient of divorce (Härkönen and Dronkers 
2006).
Other estimated parameters of Model 4 are not surprising: the main effect of country indicates 
that higher education is more easily accessible in some countries and less accessible in some 
other countries (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, and Romania exhibit 
particularly low odds of completing university education, net of other factors). We further 
observe that men, on average, have lower chances of obtaining tertiary degrees than women (cf. 
Buchmann and DiPrete 2006). The main effect of cohort reflects educational expansion – the 
growing odds of obtaining tertiary degrees in the population. Obviously, the chances of college 
graduation are strongly influenced by parental education: the log odds of obtaining a bachelor’s 
diploma are higher by 2.383 among children of college educated parents in comparison to 
children whose parents only had lower secondary (or lower) education (see Table 3).
6.2 Random-intercept Logistic Regression Models
Now we proceed to present multi-level random-intercept logistic regression models of college 
graduation. We use two different specifications of the multi-level model. We start with two 
continuous level-2 variables – the crude divorce rate and share of individuals with tertiary 
education (these level-2 variables are utilized along with level-1 covariates including gender, 
parental education, and breakup). The second specification adds also country fixed-effects into 
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the model. We use this latter specification to make sure that our results are not biased by some 
omitted country-level variable.
<Table 4 about here>
We are primarily interested in testing a cross-level interaction between level-1 measure of 
parental breakup and the level-2 measure of the crude divorce rate. As before, we use the 
likelihood ratio test as well as AIC and BIC to compare models with and without this interaction. 
AIC and BIC values are based on the deviance statistic and are computed using the formulas 
proposed by Hox (2010: 50-51); the number of individual respondents is used as the number of 
observations in the calculation of BIC (see STATA Corp. 2011: 159-163).6 Table 4 presents 
goodness of fit statistics of all multi-level models.
Model 5 employs all explanatory variables additively, while Model 6 also adds the cross-level 
interaction between breakup and divorce rate. By criteria of classical statistical inference we 
should prefer Model 6 to Model 5, i.e. we should not leave the interaction out of the model (the 
comparison of the two models leads to L2 = 9.9 with one degree of freedom, which implies p = 
0.002). Again, AIC and BIC tend to contradict each other – AIC would favour keeping the 
interaction, whereas BIC indicates no difference in model fit between the models, in which case 
the more parsimonious Model 5 should be preferred. We are inclined to keep the interaction in 
the model and inspect its substantive significance.
6 The calculation of the BIC statistic corresponds to a situation when are all level-1 observation 
independent. This assumption is violated in our case. We therefore have higher confidence in 
AIC, since BIC uses sample size in its calculation and is thus likely to show an unsubstantiated 
bias towards more parsimonious models.
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Estimated effects of Model 6 are presented in Table 5. We see from the main effect of parental 
breakup that parental separation has a slight negative effect on the odds of college graduation 
when the crude divorce rate is 0, i.e. when the divorce rate is at its minimum observed in the data 
(the effect on the log odds of college graduation is -0.140, which is significantly different from 0 
at the 0.1 level). The interaction between parental breakup and divorce rate tells us that the effect 
of breakup becomes more negative with higher divorce rates. When the divorce rate reaches its 
maximum in our data set, the effect of parental breakup on the log odds of college graduation is 
-0.607 (= -0.140-0.467, see Model 6 in Table 5).
Models 7 and 8 contain also country fixed-effects in addition to all effects already present in 
Models 5 and 6. Yet, comparing Models 7 and 8 leads to the same conclusion that we achieved 
earlier – we should keep the cross-level interaction between parental breakup and crude divorce 
rate in the model (by the criteria of classical inference, the test of the hypothesis that the 
interaction is in fact zero leads to L2 = 10.5 with 1 d. f., p = 0.001; also AIC is in favour of 
keeping the interaction, whereas BIC is not; see Table 4).
<Table 5 about here>
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Inspecting the estimated parameters of Model 8 (see Table 5), we again see that the negative net 
effect of parental breakup becomes more negative when divorce rates are higher. For instance, 
the negative effect of parental breakup on the log odds of college completion is -0.137 when 
divorce rate is at its minimum level (this effect is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 
0.1 level). The negative effect of breakup grows to -0.615 (= -0.137-0.478, see Table 5), when 
divorce rate reaches it maximum. Other effects in Model 8 bring no surprises – males, on 
average, have lower odds of obtaining a college degree; parental education has a strong positive 
effect on respondent’s education. Educational expansion seems to improve the chances to obtain 
college degrees and divorce rate, net of everything else in the model, has a negative effect on 
educational attainment. 7
6.3 Additional Sensitivity Analyses
Redefining the main explanatory variable (parental breakup) and using a different cutoff age has 
no apparent effect on the results. When we move the decisive cutoff point to 15 years and re-
estimate all models, we still see the same patterns of interactions. For instance, in Model 2 the 
7 As a robustness check, we limited the sample to respondents who reported their parents’ 
education (N = 88941) and re-estimated Model 8. The pattern of the cross-level interaction 
between individual-level breakup and divorce rate persists unchanged. The main effect of 
breakup on the log odds of college graduation is somewhat more negative (-0.174) in this sample 
and is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. The effect of breakup grows to 
-0.625 (= -0.174-0.451) if the context-level divorce rate reaches the maximum observed in the 
data. The difference between the two effects is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 
0.01 level.
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main effect of breakup would be slightly reduced (from -0.141 in Table 3) to -0.113 (see Table 6, 
Model 2A) and the interaction with cohort is slightly more pronounced, so that the effect in the 
youngest cohort is -0.455 (= -0.113-0.342). The difference of the two slopes in the youngest 
cohort is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in Model 2A (see Table 6).
<Table 6 about here>
Similarly, Model 4A confirms the existence of the interaction between breakup and cohort even 
with this alternatively specified indicator of breakup. The main effect of breakup appears 
somewhat weaker (-0.192, see Table 6, Model 4A) than it was before (-0.237, see Table 3, Model 
4). On the other hand, the interaction between breakup and cohort is stronger, and reaches a 
higher level of statistical significance. The effect of the breakup is -0.441 (= -0.192-0.249, see 
Table 6) in the most recent cohort. The difference between the breakup effect in the eldest and 
the youngest cohort is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, whereas it was significant at the 
0.1 level with the original definition of parental breakup.
We utilized this alternative definition of parental breakup also in the random-intercept logistic 
regression models with little deviation from the already observed pattern. For instance, in Model 
6A we see that the main effect of breakup is -0.073 when divorce rate is at its minimum and it 
increases to -0.650 (= -0.073-0.577, see Table 7, Model 6A) when divorce rate reaches its 
maximum observed in the data, i.e. is only slightly more negative than in Model 6. Similarly, the 
main effect of breakup is reduced somewhat in Model 8 (from -0.137 in Model 8 to -0.069 in 
Model 8A, see Tables 5 and 7). But even Model 8A documents that the cross-level interaction 
between breakup and divorce rate is rather strong and significant (the negative effect of breakup 
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is further reduced by -0.589 if we move from the lowest CDR to the highest CDR observed in 
our data; this interaction is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, see Table 7).
Furthermore, we wanted to see if any country in our sample may have had a particularly strong 
influence on the results. Hence, we checked whether omitting any single country from the 
sample would alter the results and found that the results are quite robust. For instance, we have 
seen that the main effect of parental breakup on the log odds of college completion was -0.141 in 
Model 2, and the interaction between breakup and the most recent cohort was -0.276. When re-
estimate this model 13 times omitting one country in each run, we obtain a range of estimates of 
both the main effect of breakup and of the interaction. The main effect varies between -0.102 
(when deleting Germany from the data set) to -0.205 (when omitting Estonia). The interaction 
ranges from -0.179 (when Estonia is omitted) to -0.351 (when the German data are not included 
in the sample). The difference between the effects of breakup in the oldest and youngest cohort 
turns out to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level in 12 out of the total 13 model re-
estimations. The only exception occurs when we omit the Estonian data from the analysis.
We carried out the same procedure in the context of the random-intercept logistic regression 
model (Model 6). There we see that the main effect of parental breakup varies between -0.112 
(when the Netherlands is omitted from the analysis) and -0.185 (when the Australian data are not 
used), and the cross-level interaction varies between -0.365 (without Australian data) and -0.535 
(when Hungarian data is left out). These procedures reveal that the interaction between breakup 
and divorce rate is statistically significant at the 0.05 in all 13 re-estimation runs. We conclude 
that no single country seems to be driving the results observed above.
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7 Conclusions and Discussion
This paper analysed variations in the effect of parental breakup on children’s odds of attaining 
tertiary education in 13 countries and 4 cohorts. We focused on the effect of the experience of 
parental separation when controlling for parental socioeconomic status and other variables. Our 
analysis makes a contribution to this field of research in three ways: (1) We have examined the 
size of the family dissolution effect on children’s education across countries, which has never 
been done so far. (2) We have estimated variations in the effect of breakup across a relatively 
large group of contexts (both countries and cohorts), which makes our results quite robust and 
generalizable. (3) We have linked the separation effect explicitly to prevailing divorce rate and 
estimated a multi-level model with an embedded cross-level interaction. This approach allows 
for a more direct inference of the mechanism responsible for this variation and is superior to 
inferences based solely on comparisons across countries and/or over cohorts.
We evaluated two competing hypotheses: (1) declining stress and selection hypothesis and (2) 
declining parental conflict hypothesis. Both of them are related to the variations in the 
prevalence of divorce across contexts. The hypothesis of declining parental conflict assumes that 
the disadvantage related to parental separation increases over cohorts and is higher when more 
families break up. As family dissolution becomes more common, even couples with less conflict 
separate. Then the child is negatively affected by loss of the family rather than relieved from a 
dysfunctional parental relationship. This explanation was supported by the analysis: indeed the 
negative effect of parental separation is stronger (i.e. more negative) in contexts with higher 
prevalence of divorce. We observed an increasing negative effect over cohorts within countries, 
which is consistent with the trend observed by Evans et al. (2001) in Australia, while studying 
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completion of secondary education. Moreover, we were able to link the size of this effect directly 
to the prevailing divorce rates in the given contexts, which no previous study accomplished.
The main finding holds vis-à-vis partial model re-specifications, and appears to be rather robust. 
For instance, we used both standard binary logistic regression and multi-level logistic regression 
(with and without several level-1 controls) to identify consistent substantive findings. Moreover, 
modifying the operational definition of the main explanatory variable (parental separation) and 
taking all breakups before age 15 (instead of age 18 as we did in the main part of the analysis) 
does not change the results virtually at all. Furthermore, a re-definition of the set of countries has 
little effect on our conclusions. Finally, if we apply listwise deletion of cases with missing 
parental education (instead of keeping these as a separate category in the analysis), we see very 
little change in our findings.
This result illustrates how population trends feed inequality. Most modern countries have been 
experiencing increasing divorce rates in recent decades. This paper has illustrated that this 
development exacerbates the disadvantage that children from broken homes bring into their 
lives. This finding hints that stratification scholars should pay more attention to the effects of 
growing variability in family forms experienced by children. This variability includes, but is not 
limited to, children of divorced, cohabiting, single, and step-parents, all of which are increasingly 
present in many modern societies.
Our result about growing detrimental consequences of breakup contrasts with Kalmijn’s (2010) 
paper, which studied the effect of own divorce on adult wellbeing and showed that the negative 
effect diminishes when divorce becomes more common. The reason for such inconsistency might 
be two-fold. First, we studied the consequences of parental separation on children, while Kalmijn 
investigated the adults who divorced themselves. It is possible that divorce affects adults (who 
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are more directly involved in making the decision about divorce) differently than children (who 
have little power to influence their parents’ separation). For instance, at least some adults may 
choose divorce correctly anticipating that their well-being would improve thereafter, and hence 
the average negative effect of divorce may be driven towards zero. This may occur more 
frequently in countries with higher prevalence of divorce. If the share of these adults increases, 
the average effect of divorce would diminish. Second, the outcome variables differ. We focused 
on educational attainment (college graduation), while Kalmijn studied the self-reported level of 
well-being. While any disruption of the educational career may have a lasting effect, since school 
re-entry is still a rather uncommon phenomenon, well-being may improve over time, for instance 
after re-marriage (cf. Shapiro 1996; Weingarten 1980, 1985). Since divorce and re-marriage rates 
tend to be correlated, people enjoy the positive effects of re-marriage more often in recent 
decades, and thus the effect of divorce is mitigated by remarriage. However, parental re-marriage 
may not have the same positive consequence for children’s schooling, since step-parents might 
be less willing to invest into education of their step-children, and prefer to support their 
biological children (cf. Case et al. 2001; Pong 1997; Stewart 2010; Tillman 2007).
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8 Appendix: Selected Historical Changes in Divorce Legislations and Divorce Rates
In general, 20th century Europe moved towards both more liberal divorce legislation and higher 
divorce rates (for more see Antoloskaia 2000). The interconnectedness of these two trends, 
however, remains a matter of discussion (Allen 2004; Gonzáles and Viitanen 2006; Kalmijn 
2007; Kneip and Bauer 2009; Smith 2004).
Considering our sample of countries (Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, and Romania), the crude 
divorce rate rose steadily and the legislation became gradually more liberal for the most part of 
the century. In Australia, the main legislative change occurred in 1975 when at-fault divorce was 
replaced by irretrievable breakdown (Finlay 2001). The change was reflected in divorce rates, 
which rose from a level of 1.7 in 1975 to 4.5 in the following year. Then the rate started to drop 
again – from the levels around 3 to levels around 2. Similarly, when obtaining divorce was made 
easier in Belgium in 1994 (Pintens 2002), the crude divorce rate increased from 2.2 in 1994 to 
3.5 in 1995, and then stabilized around the level of 3. Along the same lines, a sharp decline in 
divorce rates can be seen in the case of the Czech Republic and Romania, tying up with divorce 
legislation changes. In the Czech Republic, the 1998 change lead to the decline from 3.1 in 1998 
to 2.3 in 1999 (Hrušáková 2002). In Romania, the 1966 change (Muresan et al. 2008; 
Boldureanu and Paduraru 2008) resulted in an even more pronounced drop – while in 1965 the 
rate was 1.9, in 1966 it was 1.4, and then 0.0 and 0.2 in 1967 and 1968, respectively. In both 
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instances, the rates then returned to their previous levels. In Hungary, only the 1945 change (see 
Weiss and Szeibert 2002) seems to have had an effect: divorce rates around 0.5 rose to levels 
around 1.5 and 2 during the following years. In the Netherlands, the 1970 liberalization (see 
Boele-Woelki et al. 2002) was followed by a steady increase in the divorce rate, from levels 
around 1 to levels around 2. In Italy divorce was legalized in 1970, and since then the rate has 
been rising steadily (Patti et al. 2002). In Estonia, the divorce rate was increasing between the 
1960s and the first half of the 1990s, from the levels around 2 to levels around 4. In 1995 the rate 
was as high as 5.2, but then it started to decline – all the way down to the level of 2.2 in 2010 (a 
new family act was passed in 1995; Rootalu 2010).
In other countries, legislative changes did not impact divorce rates as dramatically; this was true 
for Bulgaria8 (see Todorova 2002), France (for more see Ferrand 2002), Germany (Martiny and 
Schwab 2002), Lithuania, and Norway (Sverdrup 2002; Hyggen and Skevik 2002) where there 
was a steady rise to current levels. Nowadays, Belgium is considered to have one of the highest 
crude divorce rates, around the level of 3. This is mostly the case for Belgium’s region of 
Wallonia, however, not Flanders where divorce is less frequent and is viewed negatively 
(Snoeckx et al. 2007). In 2010, the crude divorce rate for our selected countries was as follows: 
2.3 in Australia, 3.0 in Belgium, 1.5 in Bulgaria, 2.9 in the Czech Republic, 2.2 in Estonia, 2.1 in 
France, 2.3 in Germany, 2.4 in Hungary, 0.9 in Italy, 3.0 in Lithuania, 1.9 in the Netherlands, 2.4 
in Norway, and 1.5 in Romania (see Table A).
8In Bulgaria, secular divorce legislation was introduced in 1945 (Todorova 2002); around this time we can see a rise 
in the crude divorce rate from the levels around 0.2 to levels around 1 (Table A).
31
Table A. Crude divorce rates in selected countries 1920-2010.
Australia Belgium Bulgaria Czechia Estonia France Germany Hungary Italy Lithuania Netherlands Norway Romania
1917 0.1
1918 0.1
1919 0.2 0.2
1920 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5
1921 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5
1922 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5
1923 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5
1924 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5
1925 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.5
1926 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.5
1927 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.5
1928 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.5
1929 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.5
1930 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4
1931 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4
1932 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4
1933 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4
1934 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5
1935 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5
1936 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6
1937 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6
1938 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7
1939 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
1940 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.6
1941 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
1942 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
1943 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6
1944 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
1945 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.9
1946 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.8 0.9 0.0 1.1 0.7 1.3
1947 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.7 1.2
1948 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.2 0.2 0.8 0.7 1.1
1949 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.8 1.4 0.2 0.7 0.7 1.3
1950 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.9 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.5
1951 0.9 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.5 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.2
1952 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.2 0.8 1.3 1.4 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.4
1953 0.9 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.3
1954 0.7 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.7 1.1 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.7
1955 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.8
1956 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.7
1957 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.9
1958 0.7 0.5 0.8 1.4 0.7 1.0 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 2.0
1959 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.4 0.7 1.0 2.2 0.8 0.5 0.6 1.7
1960 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.3 2.1 0.7 1.0 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.7 2.0
1961 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.5 2.0 0.7 1.0 1.7 0.9 0.5 0.7 1.8
1962 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 0.7 1.0 1.7 0.9 0.5 0.7 2.0
1963 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.2 0.6 1.0 1.8 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.9
1964 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.5 2.5 0.7 1.1 1.9 0.9 0.5 0.7 1.9
1965 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.3 0.7 1.1 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.7 1.9
1966 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.8 3.2 0.7 1.1 2.0 1.8 0.6 0.7 1.4
1967 0.8 0.6 1.2 1.8 3.2 0.8 1.2 2.1 1.8 0.6 0.8 0.0
1968 0.9 0.6 1.2 1.9 3.1 0.7 1.2 2.1 2.0 0.6 0.8 0.2
1969 0.9 0.7 1.1 2.1 3.3 0.8 1.3 2.1 2.1 0.7 0.8 0.4
1970 1.0 0.7 1.2 2.2 3.2 0.8 1.3 2.2 2.2 0.8 0.9 0.4
1971 1.0 0.7 1.1 2.4 3.2 0.9 1.4 2.3 0.3 2.2 0.9 1.0 0.5
1972 1.2 0.8 1.2 2.3 3.3 0.9 1.5 2.3 0.6 2.3 1.1 1.0 0.5
1973 1.2 0.9 1.3 2.5 3.2 1.0 1.6 2.4 0.3 2.5 1.3 1.2 0.7
1974 1.3 1.0 1.3 2.5 3.3 1.1 1.8 2.3 0.3 2.5 1.4 1.3 0.9
1975 1.7 1.1 1.3 2.6 3.4 1.2 1.9 2.5 0.2 2.7 1.5 1.4 1.6
1976 4.5 1.3 1.3 2.5 3.6 1.1 2.0 2.6 0.2 2.9 1.5 1.5 1.7
1977 3.2 1.3 1.5 2.5 3.9 1.3 1.5 2.6 0.2 3.1 1.6 1.5 1.2
1978 2.8 1.4 1.5 2.6 3.8 1.4 1.0 2.7 0.2 3.0 1.6 1.5 1.5
1979 2.6 1.4 1.4 2.5 4.1 1.5 1.6 2.6 0.2 3.2 1.7 1.6 1.6
1980 2.7 1.5 1.5 2.6 4.1 1.5 1.8 2.6 0.2 3.2 1.8 1.6 1.5
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1981 2.8 1.6 1.5 2.7 4.1 1.6 2.0 2.6 0.2 3.2 2.0 1.7 1.5
1982 2.9 1.0 1.5 2.7 3.9 1.7 2.1 2.7 0.3 3.1 2.2 1.7 1.5
1983 2.8 1.6 1.6 2.8 4.2 1.8 2.2 2.7 0.2 3.2 2.3 1.9 1.5
1984 2.8 1.7 1.5 3.0 4.1 1.9 2.3 2.7 0.3 3.2 2.4 1.9 1.5
1985 2.5 1.9 1.6 2.9 4.0 2.0 2.3 2.8 0.3 3.2 2.4 2.0 1.4
1986 2.5 1.9 1.1 2.9 3.9 2.0 2.3 2.8 0.3 3.3 2.1 1.9 1.5
1987 2.4 1.9 1.3 3.0 3.9 1.9 2.3 2.8 0.5 3.2 1.9 2.0 1.5
1988 2.5 2.1 1.4 3.0 3.8 1.9 2.3 2.3 0.5 3.2 1.9 2.1 1.6
1989 2.5 2.0 1.4 3.0 3.8 1.9 2.2 2.4 0.5 3.3 1.9 2.2 1.6
1990 2.5 2.0 1.3 3.1 3.7 1.9 1.9 2.4 0.5 3.4 1.9 2.4 1.4
1991 2.6 2.1 1.3 2.8 3.7 1.9 1.7 2.4 0.5 4.1 1.9 2.4 1.6
1992 2.6 2.2 1.1 2.8 4.3 1.9 1.7 2.1 0.5 3.7 2.0 2.4 1.3
1993 2.7 2.1 0.9 2.9 3.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 0.4 3.7 2.0 2.5 1.4
1994 2.7 2.2 0.9 3.0 3.8 2.0 2.0 2.3 0.5 3.0 2.4 2.5 1.7
1995 2.8 3.5 1.3 3.0 5.2 2.1 2.1 2.4 0.5 2.8 2.2 2.4 1.5
1996 2.9 2.8 1.2 3.2 4.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 0.6 3.1 2.3 2.3 1.6
1997 2.8 2.6 1.1 3.2 3.8 2.0 2.3 2.4 0.6 3.1 2.2 2.3 1.5
1998 2.7 2.6 1.3 3.1 3.2 2.0 2.3 2.5 0.6 3.2 2.1 2.1 1.8
1999 2.8 2.6 1.2 2.3 3.3 2.0 2.3 2.5 0.6 3.2 2.1 2.0 1.5
2000 2.6 2.6 1.3 2.9 3.1 1.9 2.4 2.3 0.7 3.1 2.2 2.2 1.4
2001 2.9 2.9 1.3 3.1 3.2 1.9 2.4 2.4 0.7 3.2 2.3 2.3 1.4
2002 2.7 3.0 1.3 3.1 3.0 1.9 2.5 2.5 0.7 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.5
2003 2.7 3.0 1.5 3.2 2.9 2.1 2.6 2.5 0.8 3.1 1.9 2.4 1.5
2004 2.6 3.0 1.9 3.2 3.1 2.2 2.6 2.4 0.8 3.2 1.9 2.4 1.6
2005 2.6 2.9 1.9 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.5 0.8 3.3 2.0 2.4 1.5
2006 2.5 2.8 1.9 3.1 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.5 0.8 3.3 1.9 2.3 1.5
2007 2.3 2.8 2.1 3.0 2.8 2.1 2.3 2.5 0.9 3.4 2.0 2.2 1.7
2008 2.2 3.3 1.9 3.0 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.5 0.9 3.1 2.0 2.1 1.7
2009 2.3 3.0 1.5 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.4 0.9 2.8 1.9 2.1 1.5
2010 2.3 3.0 1.5 2.9 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4 0.9 3.0 1.9 2.4 1.5
Note: with the exception of Australia and Czech Republic, the 1920-1924 and 1925-1929 rates are 5-year averages; Germany 
includes former GDR; 1940-1944 and 1945-1949 rates are averages for Eastern and Western Germany combined
Source: Eurostat, UN Demographic Yearbook (various volumes 1958-2010)
Below we summarize the history of legislative change in detail for countries where we have been 
able to obtain some historical descriptions.
The divorce legislation of  Australia is based on the 1857 English Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes Act. The present family law system was introduced in 1975 by the Family Law Act, in 
which fault grounds were replaced by grounds of irretrievable breakdown (Finlay 2001). Until 
1975 the crude divorce rate was relatively low; in 1974 the rate was 1.3, in 1975 it was 1.7. In 
1976,  however,  it  reached 4.5.  After  this  rise  the  rate  slowly declined,  stopping somewhere 
around the level of 2.5 (2.5 in 1990; 2.6 in 2000; 2.3 in 2010).
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The divorce legislation of Belgium is based on the Napoleonic Code (1804). More or less stable 
between 1804 and 1974, divorce was made easier in 1994. Nowadays, the most common way of 
ending a marriage is by mutual consent (Pintens 2002). Divorce rates have grown dramatically 
over last thirty years, and now are among the highest in Europe (the crude divorce rate was 2.0 in 
1990, 3.5 in 1995, 2.6 in 2000, and 3.0 in 2010). However, the high divorce rate mostly applies 
to the region of Wallonia, not Flanders where it is low and where attitudes towards divorce have 
been observed to be negative (see Snoeckx et al. 2007).
In  Bulgaria secular divorce legislation was not applied until 1945; the pre-existing canon law, 
however, recognized some grounds for divorce (Todorova 2002). The legislation was changed in 
1952, guided by the idea of marriage preservation, and leading to a ban on divorce by mutual 
consent. In 1968 grounds for divorce were reduced to two in the first Bulgarian Family Code: 
mutual consent and irretrievable breakdown. These grounds were preserved in the second Family 
Code of 1985, which remains the basis of divorce legislation (Todorova 2002). Since the 1960s 
the crude divorce rate has been around 1.5 (1.3 in 1990, 1.3 in 2000, 1.5 in 2010).
In the  Czech Republic divorce has been possible since 1919; the complex rules of the “First 
Republic”  (1918-1938)  were  reformed  in  1950.  After  1964  the  fault  ground  was  gradually 
abandoned. Divorce rates rose for most of the 20th century. The current family legislation is based 
on 1998 changes in family law (for more see Hrušáková 2002). This change brought about sharp 
decline in crude divorce rates, from 3.1 in 1998 to 2.3 in 1999. Since then the rates have returned 
to their previous levels (2.9 in 2010).
In France the possibility of divorce briefly existed in early 19th century (Code Napoleon 1804) 
but was abolished during the Restoration. The 1884 Loi Naquet established divorce on fault 
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grounds. Divorce legislation was then reformed in 1975, favouring mutual consent, but keeping 
other grounds as well  (Ferrand 2002). The divorce rate was on the rise since the 1960s and 
nowadays the divorce is common (Rydell 2002). In 2000s divorce rates were still rising. On the 
other hand, in the last few years a share of dissolving families with under aged children has been 
decreasing (Prioux and Mandelbaum 2008). In the year 1990 the crude divorce rate was 1.9; in 
2000 it was 1.9; in 2010 it was 2.1.
Unified divorce legislation for the entire Germany (German Reich) existed since the year 1900. 
In  1938 separate  Marriage  Act  was  introduced.  After  1949,  the  legislation  did  differ  in  the 
Western and the Eastern parts of Germany. In GDR, the Family Law Code was introduced in 
1965 with the irretrievable breakdown as the only ground for divorce. In the GFR, family law 
was reformed in 1976. Since 1990, the laws of GFR have applied in GDR (Martiny and Schwab 
2002). In 1976 the crude divorce rate was 2.0; in the following year it was 1.5. In 1990 the rate 
declined slightly – from 2.2 in 1989 to 1.9. Then we can observe slow rise to levels around 2 (2.3 
in the year 2010).
In  Hungary, the divorce legislation did not change between 1894 and 1945. The 1945 reform 
brought  about  an inclusion of  new grounds,  while  the old grounds were kept.  The law was 
reformed in 1963 and then again in the Act of 1974 to accommodate cases of consent. In the 
1974  Act  the  only  ground  for  divorce  was  irretrievable  breakdown.  The  Family  Act  was 
reformed/ amended again in 1986 and in 1995 (Weiss and Szeibert 2002). In 1945 the crude 
divorce rate was 0.2; the following year it was 0.9. The other reforms do not seem to have had 
any particularly pronounced effect on divorce rates. From the 1960s on we can see steady rise in 
divorce rates; nowadays the levels are around 2.5.
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In Italy, divorce was made possible in 1970. The law was then amended in 1978 and 1987. The 
1987 reform was more important and far-reaching, “emphasis[ing] the nature of divorce as a 
‘remedy’ and stress[ing] the fact that the parties’ wish to dissolve their marriage takes precedence 
over the judge’s power to prevent the parties from regaining their single status” (Patti et al. 2002: 
4). In 1971 the crude divorce rate in Italy was at the level of 0.3. Neither the 1978, nor the 1987 
reforms seems to have had an immediate effect as the divorce rate was the same the follow year 
(0.2 and 0.5 respectively). However, from the 1970s onwards we can observe a steady increase, 
with the crude divorce rate at 0.9 in 2010.
The Dutch legislation was liberalized in the 1970s. Since 1971 the only ground for divorce in the 
Netherlands is irretrievable breakdown. However, it is also possible to change one’s marriage to 
registered partnership, which can then be dissolved merely by consent of the partners (Boele-
Woelki et al. 2002; Fokkema et al. 2008). The divorce rates increased between the 1960s and 
1980s; currently the rates are rather high (Kalmijn et al. 2004) but stable (Fokkema et al. 2008): 
around 2 (1.8 in 1980, 1.9 in 1990, 2.2 in 2000, and 1.9 in 2010).
In  Norway divorce has been possible since the 17th century. The 20th century liberalization of 
divorce legislation was based on liberal laws passed in the 19th century. In 1909 mutual consent 
after  a  one-year  period  of  separation  was  introduced  as  an  addition  to  the  already-existing 
grounds of fault and irretrievable breakdown. Legislation in this form was preserved in the 1918 
Marriage Act. New divorce regime was introduced by the 1991 Marriage Act (in force since 
1993)  –  divorce  can  be  granted  after  period  of  separation  or  non-cohabitation,  consent  or 
particular ground is no longer necessary (Sverdrup 2002; Hyggen and Skevik 2002). The divorce 
rate increased in the 1960s and the 1970s. Nowadays the crude divorce rate is rather high, and 
according to Tjotta and Vaage (2008) is reinforced by public transfers to divorced families (see 
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also Clarke and Jensen 2004; Andersson et al. 2006). In the year 1990 the crude divorce rate was 
2.4; in 2000 it was 2.2, and in 2010 it was 2.4.
The  divorce  rate  in  Romania rose  after  the  WWII  when  a  large  percentage  of  population 
migrated from rural to urban. The divorce legislation was very liberal,  but due to the rising 
number  of  divorces,  divorce  was  made  difficult  in  1966.  The  divorce  rate  remained  low; 
however, in 1974 it started to return to its previous level (in 1960 the crude divorce rate was 2.0; 
in 1970 it  was 0.4, in 1974 0.9,  in 1979 1.6). After the end of the socialist  regime, divorce 
legislation was changed; however, crude divorce rates remained low compared to other European 
countries, and have not shown a tendency to rise (1.4 in 1990; 1.5 in 2010). The reason might 
have been the economic situation, and cultural norms which make divorce difficult (Muresan et 
al. 2008;  Boldureanu and Paduraru 2008). In 2011 a new Civil Code made divorce easier for 
childless partners who agreed to divorce, and for spouses with minor children who agreed on the 
post-divorce arrangements (Buda 2012).
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10 Tables
Table 1. Sample characteristics by country. Selected countries from the Generations and Gender Survey 
(GGS), 2001-2010.
Country (1)
Original 
sample 
size (2)
Within age 
limits (3)
Without 
missing 
values (4)
Per cent non-
missing (5)a
Year of data 
collection (6)
Australia 7125 4826 4770 99 % 2005-06
Belgium 7163 5195 5077 98 % 2008-10
Bulgaria 12858 8751 8672 99 % 2004
Czech Republic 6973 6730 6502 97 % 2005
Estonia 7855 5371 5346 100 % 2004-05
France 10079 7051 6961 99 % 2005
Germany 10017 6900 6792 98 % 2005
Hungary 13540 9452 9417 100 % 2001-02
Italy 9570 8213 8213 100 % 2003
Lithuania 10036 6482 6386 99 % 2006
Netherlands 8161 6069 6058 100 % 2002-04
Norway 14881 11029 10801 98 % 2007-08
Romania 11986 8433 8418 100 % 2005
TOTAL 130244 94502 93413 99 % 2001-10
Notes: a = (4)/(3)
See text for a description of the sample specification.
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Table 2. Goodness of fit statistics of selected binary logistic regression models of college graduation. Selected 
countries from the first wave of GGS, 2001-2010. Number of individuals N = 93413.
Model Model description AIC BIC LR2 d.f. p-value
M1 Country + cohort + breakup 100940.6 101101.2 5619.5 16 <0.0005
M2 M1 + cohort x breakup 100935.6 101124.5 5630.6 19 <0.0005
M3 M1 + parental education + gender 90815.6 91014.0 15752.6 20 <0.0005
M4 M3 + cohort x breakup 90817.1 91043.8 15757.1 23 <0.0005
Contrasts
M2-M1 -5.0 23.3 11.0 3 0.012
M4-M3 1.5 29.8 4.5 3 0.213
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Table 3. Estimated coefficients of selected binary logistic regression models of college graduation. Selected 
countries from the GGS, 2001-2010. Number of observations N=93413.
Explanatory variable Model 2 Model 4
Breakup (vs. no breakup) before age 18 -0.141 -0.237**
Birth cohort (1940-1949 is reference category)
1950-1959 0.265*** 0.156***
1960-1969 0.364*** 0.068***
After 1970 0.629*** 0.103***
Parental education (Up to lower secondary is reference category)
Not reported 0.166***
Upper secondary 1.072***
Tertiary 2.383***
Male (vs. female) -0.136***
Country
Belgium 0.081* 0.500***
Bulgaria -0.654*** -0.233***
Czech Republic -1.115*** -1.000***
Estonia -0.131*** 0.183***
France -0.304*** 0.274***
Germany -0.328*** -0.433***
Hungary -0.968*** -0.678***
Italy -1.419*** -0.650***
Lithuania -0.612*** -0.110**
Netherlands 0.036 0.512***
Norway 0.093** 0.217***
Romania -1.532*** -0.641***
Interactions
Cohort x breakup
1950-1959 x breakup -0.068 -0.033
1960-1969 x breakup -0.135 -0.105
After 1970 x breakup -0.276*** -0.185*
Constant -0.862*** -1.723***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Goodness of fit statistics of selected multi-level binary logistic regression models of college 
graduation. Selected countries from the first wave of GGS, 2001-2010. Number of level-1 observations 
(individuals) N = 93413, number of level-2 observations (country x cohort) N = 52.
Model Model description AIC BIC LR2 d.f. p-value
M5 Breakup + parental education + gender + expansion + divorce rate 90522.9 90607.9 9378.7 7 <0.0005
M6 M5 + divorce rate x breakup 90514.9 90609.4 9386.7 8 <0.0005
M7 M5 + country 90471.3 90669.6 10332.9 19 <0.0005
M8 M7 + divorce rate x breakup 90462.8 90670.6 10354.4 20 <0.0005
Contrasts
M6-M5 -7.9 1.5 9.9 1 0.002
M7-M5 -51.6 61.7 75.6 12 <0.0005
M8-M7 -8.5 1.0 10.5 1 0.001
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Table 5. Estimated coefficients of selected random-intercept binary logistic regression models of college 
graduation. Selected countries from the first wave of GGS, 2001-2010. Number of level-1 observations 
(individuals) N = 93413, number of level-2 observations (country x cohort) N = 52.
Explanatory variable Model 6 Model 8
Educational expansion 1.760*** 1.291***
Divorce rate -0.931*** -0.869***
Parental breakup before age 18 -0.140* -0.137*
Parental education (Up to lower secondary is reference category)
Not reported 0.171*** 0.170***
Upper secondary 1.079*** 1.084***
Tertiary 2.391*** 2.396***
Male (vs. female) -0.140*** -0.138***
Country (Australia is reference category)
Belgium 0.365***
Bulgaria 0.036
Czech Republic -0.214*
Estonia 0.438***
France 0.391***
Germany -0.263***
Hungry -0.029
Italy -0.234**
Lithuania 0.150*
Netherlands 0.464***
Norway 0.046
Romania 0.079
Interaction
Parental breakup x Divorce rate -0.467*** -0.478***
Constant -2.295*** -2.195***
SD (Constant) 0.236 0.098
Rho 0.017 0.003
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Estimated coefficients of selected binary logistic regression models of college graduation. Selected 
countries from the GGS, 2001-2010. Number of observations N=93413.
Explanatory variable Model 2A Model 4A
Breakup (vs. no breakup) before age 15 -0.113 -0.192*
Birth cohort (1940-1949 is reference category)
1950-1959 0.265*** 0.155***
1960-1969 0.363*** 0.063**
After 1970 0.627*** 0.100***
Parental education (Up to lower secondary is reference category)
Not reported 0.164***
Upper secondary 1.070***
Tertiary 2.379***
Male (vs. female) -0.136***
Country
Belgium 0.084** 0.508***
Bulgaria -0.649*** -0.224***
Czech Republic -1.111*** -0.993***
Estonia -0.127*** 0.187***
France -0.301*** 0.279***
Germany -0.323*** -0.423***
Hungary -0.965*** -0.672***
Italy -1.414*** -0.640***
Lithuania -0.608*** -0.101**
Netherlands 0.037 0.517***
Norway 0.095*** 0.222***
Romania -1.528*** -0.634***
Interactions
Cohort x breakup
1950-1959 x breakup -0.115 -0.050
1960-1969 x breakup -0.182 -0.115
After 1970 x breakup -0.342*** -0.249**
Constant -0.866*** -1.732***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7. Estimated coefficients of selected random-intercept binary logistic regression models of college 
graduation. Selected countries from the first wave of GGS, 2001-2010. Number of level-1 observations 
(individuals) N = 93413, number of level-2 observations (country x cohort) N = 52.
Explanatory variable Model 6A Model 8A
Educational expansion 1.754*** 1.282***
Divorce rate -0.935*** -0.874***
Parental breakup before age 15 -0.073 -0.069
Parental education (Up to lower secondary is reference category)
Not reported 0.167*** 0.166***
Upper secondary 1.077*** 1.083***
Tertiary 2.388*** 2.393***
Male (vs. female) -0.139*** -0.138***
Country (Australia is reference category)
Belgium 0.371***
Bulgaria 0.042
Czech Republic -0.212*
Estonia 0.446***
France 0.394***
Germany -0.254***
Hungry -0.026
Italy -0.231**
Lithuania 0.157*
Netherlands 0.468***
Norway 0.051
Romania 0.080
Interaction
Parental breakup x divorce rate -0.577*** -0.589***
Constant -2.294*** -2.197***
SD (Constant) 0.236 0.098
Rho 0.017 0.003
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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11 Figures
Figure 1. Proportion of people with tertiary education by birth cohort in selected countries during the 20th 
century.
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Figure 2. Crude divorce rate by cohort in selected GGS countries during the 20th century.
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